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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case once again presents the federal courts with the 
serious and difficult task of balancing an individual's First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion with the 
principle, derived from the concepts of separation of powers 
and federalism inherent in our constitutional order, that 
federal courts should afford substantial deference to the 
administration of state correctional institutions. 
Specifically, we are asked to decide whether two Jewish 
inmates detained in the Pennsylvania prison system have a 
constitutional right to hot kosher meals provided to them at 
the Commonwealth's expense. 
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As inmates at the Pennsylvania State Correctional 
Institute in Somerset (the "Prison"), Appellants Jeffrey 
Johnson and Bruce Shore (the "Inmates") sued Appellees 
Raymond Sobina, the Prison Superintendent, and Martin 
Horn, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (the "Prison Officials"), in federal district court. 
Johnson, a former inmate, and Shore, still an inmate, are 
members of the Jewish faith. They allege that the Prison 
Officials' denial to them of a daily kosher diet, including two 
hot kosher meals, violated several of their constitutional 
rights. The district court granted partial summary 
judgment to both sides and entered an injunction requiring 
the Prison Officials to provide Shore with a cold kosher diet 
at the Prison's expense. Both sides appeal from that order. 
 
We have jurisdiction over that part of the district court's 
order granting summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and we will affirm the order in that respect. 
Because we decide that the district court's injunction is 
moot, we will vacate that part of the order granting 
prospective relief. 
 
I. 
 
In November 1996, Johnson and Shore were inmates at 
the Prison. Johnson was serving one to two years for 
attempted theft by deception and Shore was serving four to 
eight years for burglary. 
 
Both Johnson and Shore are Jewish and consider 
themselves bound by the laws of kashrut, or kosher. 
According to the affidavit of Rabbi Dr. Baruch A. Poupko, 
the laws of kosher are "categorically binding upon every 
Jewish man and woman." JA at 64. Kosher laws dictate 
what foods can be eaten and how they can be prepared. 
Kosher food cannot be prepared in a non-kosher kitchen, 
but a sealed, frozen kosher meal can be stored in a 
conventional freezer and heated in a conventional or 
microwave oven. 
 
A Department of Corrections policy provides that all 
inmates shall receive three meals a day, two of which are 
hot. Johnson, who previously had received kosher foods 
while in the federal prison system, arrived at the Prison in 
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May 1996. In June and July 1996, utilizing the Prison's 
grievance system, Johnson requested a kosher diet from 
Prison officials. The Prison's Grievance Coordinator denied 
his request, and Sobina affirmed this decision, stating: "Mr. 
Johnson has the ability to pick and choose items that are 
to his liking, whether it be for religious or personal diet 
reasons." JA at 39. If Sobina meant to suggest that 
Johnson's diet was a matter of personal choice, his 
response demonstrated a misunderstanding of the laws of 
kashrut. However, neither Johnson nor his Rabbi ever 
explained to Prison officials what a kosher diet entails. 
Johnson appealed Sobina's decision to the Central Office of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Upon 
recommendation of the Central Office Review Committee, 
Commissioner Horn upheld the decision. 
 
Shore arrived at the Prison in December 1995. In October 
and November 1996, Shore attempted for the first time to 
obtain kosher meals through the Prison's grievance 
procedures. As with Johnson, his request was denied. 
 
In November 1996, Johnson and Shore filed suit against 
Horn and Sobina in federal district court, alleging that the 
denial of kosher meals violated the First Amendment, giving 
rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and 
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 
U.S.C. SS 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West 1997). The Supreme 
Court subsequently declared RFRA unconstitutional. City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (RFRA 
exceeds Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers). Johnson and Shore allege that after theyfiled suit, 
they were subject to a continuing pattern of retaliation and 
anti-semitic harassment from other inmates and prison 
guards.1 Complaints to Sobina about the alleged 
harassment were unavailing. 
 
On November 13, 1996, the district court issued a 
temporary restraining order requiring the Prison Officials to 
provide Johnson and Shore with kosher food at every meal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Inmates made these allegations in a March 1997 motion for 
emergency preliminary injunction. The record does not indicate that the 
district court ever ruled on this motion, and neither these allegations 
nor 
the accompanying motion for injunctive relief are now before us. 
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The Prison subsequently provided Johnson and Shore with 
a kosher diet consisting of milk, unpeeled fruit, uncut raw 
vegetables and a vanilla-flavored liquid nutritional 
supplement called "Resource" (the "cold kosher diet"). The 
Prison charged the Inmates for the kosher food by 
deducting funds from their inmate accounts. In an affidavit 
submitted on the Inmates behalf, dietician Joanne 
Perelman stated that this diet "probably [provided] the 
proscribed [sic] number of calories and the required 
nutritional composition of vitamins and minerals." JA at 
230. However, she felt the diet placed the Inmates"in a 
compromised dietary condition" because the liquid 
nutritional supplement provided "the bulk of their 
nutrition." Id. The magistrate judge recommended against 
this original cold kosher diet as a long-term solution, but 
endorsed it pending the final outcome of the litigation, with 
the understanding that the Prison would continue to 
provide the cold kosher diet to the Inmates. Based on this 
recommendation, the district court dissolved the temporary 
restraining order on December 24, 1996. 
 
The cold kosher diet eventually was augmented to 
include granola, pretzels, cereal and saltines. Id. at 236. 
Prison dietician Brian Shedleski stated in his affidavit that 
he had performed an in-depth analysis of this diet using a 
computer model which considered the height, weight, age, 
gender and activity level of each Inmate, as well as the 
Recommend Dietary Allowance values set by the National 
Academy of Sciences. Based on this analysis, Shedleski 
concluded that "the diet is adequate and sufficiently meets 
the nutritional criteria set forth by the National Academy of 
Sciences." JA at 235. 
 
Johnson was released from custody on August 9, 1997, 
at which time his claims for injunctive relief became moot. 
He remains a plaintiff only for the purpose of seeking 
damages. 
 
At the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The Inmates argued that the cold 
kosher diet the Prison was providing them was 
constitutionally inadequate and that they, like other 
prisoners, were entitled to two hot, appetizing meals a day. 
Shore asked that the Prison be required to purchase frozen 
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kosher meals which could be heated for him twice a day in 
the Prison kitchen. The cost of purchasing frozen kosher 
meals is around $2.00 per meal, or approximately $4.00 
per inmate per day.2 On the other hand, the cold kosher 
diet costs the prison $7.24 per inmate per day. Id. at 316. 
 
On August 29, 1997, the magistrate judge filed a report 
recommending that the district court grant partial 
summary judgment to both sides. Specifically, the 
magistrate judge recommended that, in order for the Prison 
Officials to comply with the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
district court issue an injunction requiring the Prison 
Officials to (1) continue providing Shore the cold kosher diet 
and (2) refrain from charging Shore for kosher meals. The 
magistrate judge also determined that Johnson and Shore 
had no equal protection right to hot kosher meals, and 
recommended that the district court grant the Prison 
Officials qualified immunity from the Inmates' claims for 
money damages. On September 24, 1997, after the parties 
filed objections to the magistrate judge's report, the district 
court filed an opinion and order granting partial summary 
judgment to both sides and entering an injunction as 
recommended. Both sides appealed. 
 
Oral argument was heard on June 10, 1998, at which 
time counsel for the Prison Officials made the following two 
concessions: (1) the Prison Officials are required to provide 
Shore with some form of kosher diet and (2) they may not 
charge him for it. These concessions have narrowed not 
only the scope of our review, but also the jurisdiction of the 
district court. 
 
We have plenary review over the district court's decision 
to grant summary judgment. Sabo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For the first time at oral argument, the Prison Officials asserted that 
the provision of kosher meals was actually more expensive than this 
because the Prison needed to buy an additional frozen meal for heat 
testing. This assertion is not supported by the record. The declaration of 
Prison Food Services Chief Marcia Noles does state that frozen kosher 
meals have to be heat tested, but her cost evaluation does not indicate 
that a separate meal must be purchased for this purpose. See JA at 83- 
84. 
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Co., 137 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 1998). Summary judgment 
is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id.; Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
II. 
 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting a free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. 
I. In order to establish that the Prison Officials' denial of a 
hot kosher diet violates the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Inmates must show that the Prison Officials' decision 
contravenes their sincere religious beliefs, Africa v. 
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981), and that 
it is not "reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests," Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
The scope of our review has been narrowed by the Prison 
Officials' concessions at oral argument. Relevant to the 
First Amendment claim, the Prison Officials conceded that 
the Inmates are entitled to receive some kosher diet. In light 
of this concession, the Prison Officials' cross-appeal 
challenging the sincerity of the Inmates' religious beliefs is 
moot. The only issue, then, is whether the Free Exercise 
Clause requires the Prison Officials to provide the Inmates 
with hot kosher meals, as distinguished from the cold 
kosher diet.3 On this particular issue, the district court 
granted the Prison Officials partial summary judgment. We 
conclude that summary judgment was appropriate because 
the First Amendment requires only that the Prison Officials 
provide the Inmates with a kosher diet sufficient to sustain 
the Inmates in good health, and the Inmates have failed to 
create a genuine issue that the cold kosher diet 
compromises their health. 
 
"[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Prison Officials' total denial of any kosher diet prior to the 
establishment of the cold kosher diet is relevant to the Inmates' damages 
count, but summary judgment is appropriate on that count because the 
Prison Officials are entitled to qualified immunity. See infra part V. 
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constitutional rights is valid if reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests." Cooper, 855 F.2d at 128. 
The Supreme Court has noted that this inquiry necessarily 
involves the balance of two competing principles: First, an 
individual does not surrender the protections which the 
Constitution provides him when he passes through the 
prison gate; and second, prison officials must be given 
substantial deference in the administration of their 
institutions. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). In 
light of these considerations, the Court has formulated a 
four-factor test for evaluating the validity of prison 
regulations, which we previously have summarized as 
follows: (1) whether there is a rational connection between 
the regulation and the penological interest asserted; (2) 
whether inmates have alternative means of exercising their 
rights; (3) what impact accommodation of the right will 
have on guards, other inmates and the allocation of Prison 
resources generally and (4) whether alternative methods for 
accommodation exist at de minimis cost to the penological 
interest asserted. Cooper, 855 F.2d at 129 (citing Turner, 
482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)). 
 
The first Turner factor clearly favors the Prison Officials. 
The Prison has a legitimate penological interest in keeping 
its food service system as simple as possible. Ward v. 
Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir, 1993) ("The prison has a 
legitimate interest in running a simplified food service, 
rather than one that gives rise to many administrative 
difficulties."); see Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th 
Cir. 1988). In addition, we believe Shore's request for hot 
kosher food creates legitimate security concerns, including 
bringing additional foods from new sources into the Prison 
and the possible belief by other Inmates that Johnson and 
Shore are receiving special treatment. 
 
The second Turner factor--alternative means of 
observance--is neutral, favoring neither the Prison Officials 
or the Inmates. Insofar as that factor addresses the 
Inmates' general ability to exercise their faith, this interest 
weighs in the Prison Officials' favor because the Inmates 
are free to pray, meet with a Rabbi and have weekly 
religious services. See Cooper, 855 F.2d at 129. However, 
the importance of alternative means of religious observance 
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is an irrelevant consideration when the belief at issue is a 
"religious commandment," rather than a "positive 
expression of belief." Ward, 1 F.3d at 878 (discussing 
Jewish kosher laws). As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has stated: "It is one thing to curtail 
various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways 
of expressing belief may be found. It is another thing to 
require a believer to defile himself, according to the 
believer's conscience, by doing something that is completely 
forbidden by the believer's religion." Id. As in Ward, the 
Inmates here are "defiling" themselves under the laws of 
kosher when forced to eat non-kosher foods. By 
acknowledging this, we do not intend to suggest that all 
"religious commandments" must be accommodated, 
whatever their costs to legitimate penological concerns. 
However, in such situations the centrality of the religious 
tenet carries greater weight and the existence of alternative 
means of observance is of no use in the ultimate balancing 
which Turner commands. 
 
The third Turner factor--impact on guards, other inmates 
and Prison resources--is also neutral. The Prison Officials 
argue that providing Johnson and Shore with hot kosher 
meals will cause resentment among the other inmates, who 
will perceive Johnson and Shore as recipients of special 
treatment. At oral argument, counsel for the Prison Officials 
maintained that this concern would not exist if the Prison 
continues to provide only the cold kosher diet. We are not 
persuaded by this distinction. To the contrary, the record 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Inmates indicates 
that, subsequent to their requests for kosher foods and the 
provision of the cold kosher diet, both other inmates and 
Prison guards retaliated against and harassed them. We 
therefore believe that the preferential treatment problem, 
although legitimate, will exist no matter what kosher diet 
the Prison is required to serve to Shore. 
 
Finally, the fourth Turner factor--the reasonableness of 
alternatives--ultimately favors the Prison Officials. To the 
extent this factor relates to financial considerations, it 
favors the Inmates. The Prison Officials assert cost as a 
legitimate penological justification for denying the Inmates' 
request, but providing the hot kosher meals would be 
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cheaper than providing the current kosher diet. The cost 
factor, which might suggest a certain arbitrariness on the 
part of prison officials could be given some weight were we 
free to apply the state regulation requiring "reasonable 
accommodations for dietary restrictions." 37 Pa. Code 
S 93.6. However, it is not our function to look to such 
sources in circumstances like those presented here. See 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
122-123 (1984). As Turner makes clear, we are to avoid 
"unnecessarily perpetuating the involvement of the federal 
courts in the affairs of prison administration." 482 U.S. at 
89 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 
(1974)). Moreover, a careful reading of Turner suggests that 
the fourth factor is most important when the desired action 
accommodates an inmate more fully than the challenged 
regulation. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 (regulation may not 
be reasonable if suggested alternative "fully accommodates 
the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests"). If the cold kosher diet currently being provided 
satisfies kosher requirements, then the hot kosher diet 
which the Inmates suggest does not accommodate the 
Inmates any more "fully;" it merely accommodates them in 
a more palatable manner. Taste, however, is not a relevant 
constitutional consideration. 
 
Balancing these factors, we hold that the First 
Amendment requires the Prison Officials to provide the 
Inmates with a diet sufficient to sustain them in good 
health without violating the kosher laws. See Ashelman v. 
Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1997); Kahane v. 
Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1975), re-aff'd under 
Turner test by Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 
1992). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that each 
prison should receive substantial deference in formulating 
its particular plan for dietary accommodation. Here, the 
Prison is fully permitted to create the diet it believes best 
serves its legitimate penological interests as long as that 
diet (1) is kosher, and (2) sustains the Inmates in good 
health. 
 
Applying the Turner reasonableness test to the case at 
bar, the cold kosher diet currently being provided passes 
constitutional muster because it is sufficient to keep the 
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Inmates in good health. This conclusion is supported by the 
affidavit of Prison dietician Brian Shedleski, who found the 
kosher diet to be nutritionally adequate after a detailed 
analysis of the diet as applied to each Inmate's individual 
characteristics. Once the Prison Officials put forth this 
evidence, in order to survive summary judgment the 
Inmates were required to "designate `specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(e), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The Inmates made no 
such designation. 
 
To rebut Shedleski, the Inmates presented the affidavit of 
dietician Joanne Perelman, who gave the opinion that the 
original kosher diet placed the Inmates in a "compromised 
dietary condition." JA at 230. However, Perelman did not 
consider the cold kosher diet after its augmentation, which 
added granola, pretzels, cereal and saltines. Rather, she 
concluded that the original kosher diet was unhealthy 
because it relied heavily on the use of the liquid 
supplement to provide essential nutrients. Perelman's 
failure to consider the complete kosher diet strips her 
affidavit of any real probative value. Moreover, we cannot 
credit Perelman's statement that, because the cold kosher 
diet includes the Resource liquid supplement, the Inmates 
should be "monitored medically on an ongoing basis for 
nutritional deficiencies." Id. at 231. Perelman's conclusion 
in this regard was based on the fact that medical 
monitoring is appropriate for individuals "placed on liquid 
diets for the purpose of weight control," id. at 230, which 
clearly is not the case here. For these reasons, Perelman's 
affidavit is insufficient to rebut Shedleski's thorough 
analysis. Therefore, there is no genuine issue that the cold 
kosher diet, in its current form, will sustain the Inmates in 
good health, and the district court properly granted the 
Prison Officials summary judgment on this issue. 
 
III. 
 
The Inmates' second theory is that the Prison Officials' 
failure to provide the hot kosher diet violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1, because the 
 
                                11 
  
Prison provides a hot pork alternative to Muslims. 4 The 
district court granted summary judgment to the Prison 
Officials on this issue. 
 
Initially, the Prison Officials argue that the Inmates 
waived their equal protection argument because they did 
not explicitly raise an equal protection claim in either their 
complaint or their summary judgment papers. We generally 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, 
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 
1994); however, the argument was raised sufficiently in the 
district court. See Venuto v. Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, 
Cecchi & Stewart, P.C., 11 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1993). In 
Venuto, defendants in a malicious prosecution action 
argued that the plaintiffs waived their argument that being 
forced into bankruptcy was a "special grievance" supporting 
their claim. Even though the plaintiffs had not raised the 
issue, the district court considered it on the merits and 
ruled against them. We held that the issue was preserved 
for appeal because the plaintiffs could have sought leave to 
amend their complaint, the district court was put on notice, 
it decided the issue on the merits and the defendant was 
not prejudiced because both parties had briefed the issue 
fully on appeal. Id. 
 
For similar reasons, the Inmates' equal protection claims 
are properly before us. Even though the Inmates did not 
raise this claim in their complaint or their motion for 
summary judgment, the magistrate judge's report discusses 
the equal protection claims. The subsequent objections to 
the report by the Inmates and the Prison Officials certainly 
put the district court on notice that equal protection was an 
issue. Indeed, the district court "considered the record in 
light of the Report and Recommendations and the 
objections thereto," Add. at 2, and adopted the report, with 
certain modifications, as its opinion. Id. at 6. In addition, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Inmates also had argued that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the Prison Officials from charging them for a kosher diet, and 
the district court granted the Inmates summary judgment on this issue. 
The Prison Officials' cross-appeal challenges that portion of the district 
court's order. At oral argument, however, the Prison Officials conceded 
that they could not--and will not--charge Shore for kosher meals. 
Therefore, their appeal will be dismissed as moot. 
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the Inmates could have sought leave to amend their 
complaint, Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but 
the magistrate judge's consideration of the equal protection 
issues probably made amendment seem unnecessary. 
Finally, because both parties have addressed the merits of 
the equal protection claim fully, the Prison Officials will not 
be prejudiced. Therefore, we can proceed to the merits of 
the equal protection claim. 
 
The Inmates base their equal protection claim on the fact 
that, although to stay kosher they must eat cold foods and 
a liquid supplement only, the Prison accommodates Muslim 
inmates by providing hot alternatives on days when the 
Prison serves pork. "[I]n order to maintain an equal 
protection claim with any significance independent of [their] 
free exercise [claim] . . . [the Inmates] must also allege and 
prove that they received different treatment from other 
similarly situated individuals or groups." Brown v. Borough 
of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1994). The Inmates' 
claim fails because they failed to create a genuine issue 
that they are similarly situated to Muslim inmates. 
 
It is true that the Prison Officials provide an alternative 
to pork to all inmates when it appears on the menu. 
However, although Muslims are not allowed to eat pork, the 
Inmates have presented no evidence that this alternative, 
which is available to all inmates, is provided for the 
purpose of accommodating Muslims. Even assuming that 
the pork alternative is offered to accommodate Muslims, 
Muslim and Jewish inmates are not similarly situated. The 
Inmates have not pointed to evidence in the record as to 
what alternatives to pork appear on the Prison menu as an 
accommodation to Muslim inmates. Accordingly, there is no 
basis for comparing the non-pork diet with the cold kosher 
diet. Moreover, the pork substitutes are provided from 
items already in the Prison kitchen, but the proposed hot 
kosher diet would require the Prison to undertake the extra 
effort to obtain frozen meals from a new vendor and 
specially heat them in a conventional or microwave oven. 
Under these circumstances, Muslim and Jewish inmates 
are not similarly situated, because the accommodation of 
Jewish inmates would require substantially greater effort 
than the accommodation of Muslims inmates. See Dexter v. 
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Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1992) (patients with 
same disease not similarly situated unless they can be 
treated with the same procedure); cf. Klinger v. Department 
of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732-733 (8th Cir. 1994) (men 
and women at different prisons with different 
administrative and security concerns not similarly 
situated). Therefore, the Inmates' claim that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires the Prison Officials to provide 
hot kosher meals is without merit, and summary judgment 
on that issue was appropriate. 
 
IV. 
 
The Inmates argue for the first time on appeal that the 
cold kosher diet violates their right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Again, 
we generally will not consider issues raised for thefirst time 
on appeal. Harris, 35 F.3d at 845. The Inmates argue that 
they did not raise this issue in the district court because 
initially the magistrate judge only approved the cold kosher 
diet on an interim basis. The Eighth Amendment only 
became an issue, they argue, when the magistrate judge's 
second report recommended the diet's approval as a 
permanent solution. This argument is meritless. 
 
First, insofar as the Inmates' complaint requests 
monetary relief, whether the cold kosher diet violated the 
Eighth Amendment was relevant even if the diet was only 
temporary. The Inmates could have raised their Eighth 
Amendment claim, like their equal protection claim, in their 
objections to the magistrate judge's second report. 
Alternatively, they could have amended their complaint to 
include a count for an Eighth Amendment violation. Unlike 
their equal protection claim, the Inmates did not raise their 
Eighth Amendment claim by either of these means, and the 
district court did not consider the Eighth Amendment in 
reaching its decision. We therefore decline to consider this 
issue. 
 
V. 
 
The Inmates argue that the district court erred by 
granting the Prison Officials qualified immunity from money 
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damages, holding that the law entitling Jewish inmates to 
a kosher diet under the First Amendment was not clearly 
established. We believe the district court properly granted 
immunity.5 Because summary judgment was appropriate on 
the Inmates' equal protection and Eighth Amendment 
claims, the question of whether the Prison Officials were 
entitled to qualified immunity on those claims is moot. The 
only question, then, is whether the Prison Officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity on the Inmates' First 
Amendment claims. We have held that the First 
Amendment does not entitle the Inmates to hot kosher 
meals, and the Prison Officials have conceded that they 
must provide some kosher diet. However, because the 
Prison Officials did not agree to provide even the cold 
kosher diet until November 1996, the Inmates have a 
colorable First Amendment claim against the Prison 
Officials based on their failure to provide the Inmates with 
any kosher diet prior to that time. The Inmates cannot 
receive damages from the Prison Officials for such a 
violation, however, if the Prison Officials are entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 
A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from 
monetary liability unless a "reasonable public official [in his 
or her position] would know that his or her specific conduct 
violated clearly established rights." Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson 
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-637 (1987)). This inquiry is 
divided into two separate issues. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 
128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997). First, we must determine 
whether the Prison Officials' conduct violated clearly 
established law; then--but only if we answer thefirst 
inquiry affirmatively--we must determine whether an 
objectively reasonable prison official would have realized 
the illegality of his conduct. See id. Employing this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Initially, the Inmates argue that Horn waived his qualified immunity 
defense. However, in their answer to the Inmates' complaint, the Prison 
Officials allege that they are immune from suit. In addition the Inmates 
had the opportunity to present objections to the merits of the magistrate 
judge's recommendation that Horn receive qualified immunity, and the 
district court fully considered the merits of the immunity claims. The 
issue was preserved for appeal. See Venuto, 11 F.3d at 388. 
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analysis, we believe the district court correctly held that the 
Prison Officials are entitled to qualified immunity because 
the right of a prisoner to receive a kosher diet was not 
clearly established prior to November 1996. 
 
The law was clearly established if "reasonable officials in 
the [Prison Officials'] position at the relevant time could 
have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, 
that their conduct would be lawful." See Acierno v. Cloutier, 
40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc) (internal 
quotations omitted). The Inmates point to no decision of the 
Supreme Court or this Court, and we are aware of none, 
that clearly establishes their right to a kosher diet. This, 
however, may not end the inquiry, because the courts of 
appeals are divided as to whether, and to what extent, out- 
of-circuit decisions may be considered in determining 
whether the law was clearly established.6  We need not 
answer this difficult question, because we conclude that, 
under any standard, the law entitling the Inmates to a 
kosher diet was not clearly established when Horn and 
Sobina refused the Inmates' requests for kosher meals. 
Only two courts of appeals have recognized the right of a 
Jewish inmate to receive a kosher diet, Ward, 1 F.3d at 879 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The courts of appeals have taken three different approaches to this 
issue: (1) decisions from other courts of appeals may be considered, see 
Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 1998 WL 348150, at *8 n.9 (10th Cir. June 
30, 1998) (can rely on "clearly established weight of authority from other 
courts"); Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1997); Norfleet ex 
rel. 
Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 
1993). Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989), (2) such decisions 
may be considered only in exceptional circumstances, see Wilson v. 
Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("inappropriate as a 
general matter"); Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc) ("Although decisions of other courts can clearly establish the law, 
such decisions must both point unmistakenly to the unconstitutionality 
of the conduct and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct 
authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that 
his conduct was unconstitutional.") (internal quotation omitted), and 
(3) such decisions never may be considered, see Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. 
Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 823 & n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Herring, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997); 
Brady v. Fort Bend County, 58 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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(9th Cir.), Kahane, 527 F.2d at 496 (2d Cir.), and at least 
one of them does not view that right as a per se 
entitlement, Ward, 1 F.3d at 879 (remanding for 
consideration of whether prison's legitimate interests 
justified denial of kosher meals); cf. Kahey , 836 F.2d at 951 
(prison not required to comply with Muslim inmate's 
particularized diet request). Therefore, the district court 
properly granted qualified immunity to the Prison Officials.7 
 
VI. 
 
In their cross-appeal, the Prison Officials argue that the 
district court entered prospective relief in Shore's favor in 
violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 
("PLRA"). Pub. L. No. 104-134, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 
1321) 66-77 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.). The PLRA, which took effect on April 26, 
1996, 110 Stat. at 1321-1, reforms the federal courts' 
adjudicatory powers over prisoner-initiated civil litigation. 
Among its many provisions, the PLRA limits the power of 
district courts to grant prospective relief: 
 
       Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to 
       prison conditions shall extend no further than 
       necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of 
       a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not 
       grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court 
       finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no 
       further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
       Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 
       necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because the law was not clearly established, we need not decide 
whether an objectively reasonable prison official in Horn's and Sobina's 
positions would have believed his conduct violated the Inmates' First 
Amendment right to a kosher diet. In particular, we express no opinion 
as to the reasonableness of Sobina's misunderstanding of kosher law. 
 
In addition, we need not reach Horn's argument that summary 
judgment was appropriate because he was not "personally involve[d]" in 
the decision to deny the Inmates a hot kosher diet. See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) ("personal involvement" 
giving rise to S 1983 liability requires "personal direction or . . . 
actual 
knowledge and acquiescence"). 
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       The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse 
       impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal 
       justice system caused by the relief. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3626(a)(1)(A). 
 
The Prison Officials argue that the district court ordered 
them to continue providing Shore with the cold kosher diet 
and to refrain from charging him for it without making 
findings required by S 3626(a). This argument presents 
several important PLRA interpretive issues, for example: (1) 
what, if any, specific findings does the PLRA require a 
district court to make before granting prospective relief? 
and (2) must a party challenging the district court's entry 
of prospective relief make a motion to terminate that relief-- 
pursuant to S 3626(b)8-- in the district court before taking 
an appeal to this Court? We must leave these questions to 
another day, however, because the concessions made by 
the Prison Officials at oral argument render these issues 
moot. 
 
The Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary 
to the resolution of "cases and controversies." See U.S. 
Const. art. III, S 2, cl. 1; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 
149, 154-155 (1990). Mootness "ousts the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and requires dismissal of the case." 
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 335 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Section 3626(b) provides: 
 
       (2) Immediate termination of prospective relief.--In any civil 
action 
       with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall 
be 
       entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if 
the 
       relief was approved or granted in the absence of afinding by the 
       court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than 
       necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 
       least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 
       Federal right. 
 
       (3) Limitation.--Prospective relief shall not terminate if the 
court 
       makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief 
       remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the 
       Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the 
       violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is 
       narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the 
       violation. 
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(1980). The Supreme Court recently clarified that this 
fundamental principle prohibits federal courts from 
deciding on the merits any case over which they lack 
subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998) 
(specifically disapproving the practice of assuming 
jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits). Absent 
exceptional circumstances not present here,9 where a 
defendant agrees to afford all the prospective relief a 
plaintiff is requesting, mootness doctrine bars a federal 
court from deciding the merits of the issue. Philadelphia 
Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Full 
compliance with an injunction amounting to the entirety of 
the relief sought renders an issue moot."); see 13A Charles 
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 3533.2, 
at 238-239. 
 
The district court entered an injunction requiring the 
Prison Officials to provide Shore the cold kosher diet and to 
refrain from charging him for it. At oral argument, however, 
the Prison Officials conceded that (1) Shore was entitled to 
a kosher diet and (2) they were not permitted to charge him 
for it. By complying with these concessions, as they have 
been since November 1996, the Prison Officials are 
providing Shore with all the relief to which he 
constitutionally is entitled. Under these circumstances, 
there is no live "case or controversy" regarding prospective 
relief before us, and Article III ousts both us and the 
district court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of this 
issue. Accordingly, that part of the district court's order 
enjoining the Prison Officials to provide Shore with a cold 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Supreme Court has crafted a well-established exception to the 
mootness rule: Mootness will not prevent jurisdiction where the conduct 
in question is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Spencer v. 
Kemna, 118 S. Ct. 978, 988 (1998). This doctrine applies only where: "(1) 
the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated 
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there[is] a reasonable 
expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same 
action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per 
curiam). The actions of the Prison Officials do not satisfy either of 
these 
conditions. 
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kosher diet and to refrain from charging him for it will be 
vacated as moot. 
 
VII. 
 
We have not reached today's decision without sympathy 
for the plight of Mr. Shore and Mr. Johnson. The diet which 
the Prison has chosen to afford them is one which, 
perhaps, few would select as a matter of personal choice. 
Nonetheless, we must take proper heed of the federal 
courts' role in prison oversight. On this point, we turn 
again to the words of the Supreme Court: 
 
       [T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and 
       intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
       susceptible of resolution by decree. Running a prison is 
       an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires 
       expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, 
       all of which are peculiarly within the province of the 
       legislative and executive branches of government. 
       Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has 
       been committed to the responsibility of those branches, 
       and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of 
       judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is 
       involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to 
       accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 
 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85. In light of this admonition and 
the enactment of the PLRA, we are left wondering why the 
Inmates did not bring their claim in state court, where they 
would be entitled to the full protection of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and enforcement of Department of Corrections 
regulations, without the strictures imposed by the PLRA. 
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by the Inmates' 
counsel at oral argument, we have full confidence that the 
Pennsylvania judiciary will enforce the civil rights of prison 
inmates to the full extent permitted by the law. 
 
We have considered all the parties' arguments and 
conclude that no further discussion is necessary. That part 
of the district court's order granting partial summary 
judgment to both parties and granting Horn and Sobina 
qualified immunity will be affirmed. That part of the district 
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court's order enjoining Horn and Sobina to provide Shore a 
kosher diet at no cost will be vacated as moot. 
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